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ABSTRACT 
This essay focuses on the topic of technique in the thought of the well-known biologist, 
zoologist and anthropologist Adolf Portmann (1897-1982). First of all I’ll try to 
understand the biological and anthropological roots, that make a naturally-artificial 
(namely technical) being of a man. Then I’ll examine what kind of role and weight 
Portmann assignes to the technique, underlining risks and chances, closely linked to it, 
and showing the essentially expressive and self-expressive function of it. Finally I’ll 
specify the relationship between the development of technique in our society and the loss 
of the primary world: the aesthetic world of imagination. 
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1. Biology as a technical world power 
 
It is natural for technique and its unexpected development to determine a 
natural form of resistance in man. Just as it is natural for such resistance to 
be overpowered, sooner or later. Francesco Petrarca calls Adolf Portmann 
(1897-1982)1 to our mind. He was highly critical of firearms and their sudden 
diffusion, but this is not the reason why they did not become popular in 
Europe.  
According to the famous Swiss biologist, zoologist and anthropologist, 
technique, in its varied forms and endless applications, is ingrained in man 
and has somehow accompanied him since the beginning of his existence. 
Biotechnology is an example of this: the fermentation processes for the 
preparation of bread, alcoholic fermentation as a stupefacient instrument, 
contraceptive methods, the cultivation of plants starting from the wild ones, 
the breeding of animals starting from the wild ones all represent original 
practices of biotechnology, that are as old as man2. Of course, in the XX° 
                                                 
1 Adolf Portmann, Biologie als technische Weltmacht, in Entläßt die Natur den Menschen?, 
Piper, München 1970, pg. 365. 
2 Ibidem, pgs. 364-365; Adolf Portmann, Wir sind unterwegs. Der Mensch in seiner 
Umwelt, Walter, Olten-Freiburg i.B. 1973, pgs. 36-41. 
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century we have been witness to a real revolution in the field of biochemistry 
and biophysics, whose potential and risks were already before the eyes of the 
author in the 70s; so much that, somehow, biology today seems to be the 
field for technical application par excellence – all the more so after the recent 
breakthroughs in the field of genetics. The ability to create organic tissues, 
to imitate processes of the metabolism, to synthesize new substances; the 
possibility for in vitro fertilization, for artificial insemination, for the 
cultivation of ovules outside the mother’s womb, etc. these imposing 
applications make biology in the 1900s seem like the most advanced 
technique3. 
Therefore it becomes a must to ask whether or not to support or obstruct 
such pressing development. This would immediately lead us to cope with the 
thorny and current problems of genetic manipulation, of the limits of 
intervention by researchers, etc. Instead, following Portmann, we will try to 
understand, as a first step, the biological and anthropological roots that 
make a naturally artificial, that is technical, being out of man. Secondly, we 
will try to grasp the intrinsically phobic and insane that can coexist with the 
essence itself of technique. 
 
 
2.  Opaqueness and transparency as the origin of technique 
 
From a biological point of view, we think the crucial passage consists in the 
progressive loss of body transparency by complex living beings. In the 
elementary forms of life, in fact, “transparency of organisms is an essential 
part of their way of revealing themselves4“. Sea molluscs, for instance, are 
often transparent, semitransparent or opalescent, which implies perfect 
correspondence between internal conformation and external structure. There 
is nothing in them that is concealed or that wishes to be concealed and 
communication with the outside occurs in an immediate manner, precisely 
that of transparency. The animal is exactly as it looks, the inside is already 
outside, and the only function body surface has is that of disappearing, 
allowing what that boundary surrounds to be seen: the inside and the 
outside are one whole. When this transparency survives in superior animals, 
the organs in the metabolism, the viscera – by nature asymmetrical – are 
compressed inside an iridescent casing, called nucleus vegetativus; the rest of 
                                                 
3 Adolf Portmann, Biologie als technische Weltmacht, cited, pg. 366. 
4 Adolf Portmann, La vita come rapporto preordinato, in Le forme viventi. Nuove prospettive 
della biologia, Adelphi, Milano 1989, pg. 22. 
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the body, instead, dilates, expands, taking on rigorous bilateral symmetry5. 
In other words, it is as if that which escapes symmetry by nature, were 
confined within a coloured wrapping, inaccessible to the eye. 
The increasing complexity of animal organization, however, leads to an 
internal/external separation that is more and more obvious and considerable: 
optical transparency withdraws progressively in an opaque structure of the 
surface6. The opaque surface becomes an organ in every respect, whose 
purpose is not only to protect the inside and allow exchange with the 
outside, but also to express the interiority, to mediate it – through patterns 
and chromatic ornaments, sounds, olfactory emanation, movements, actions. 
In other words, an opposition between the inside and the outside is outlined, 
marking the birth, in every respect, of a bi-dimensional system “largely 
independent of the structures inside7“, and favouring the formation of a 
central nervous system. Such a central position allows introduction of the 
animal into the world to take place under the form of mediation, so that the 
interiority (a combination of activities that is correlated to the environment) 
uses the external aspect of the organism more and more often. 
The external part, now separated from the internal one, implies the birth 
of an elementary form of interiority. The whole organism develops indirect 
techniques of communication, of self-presentation, through which it ‘learns’ 
to communicate symbolically with the outside, through colours, ornaments, 
patterns, words, etc. Opaqueness first, allows a form of concealment and 
thus an early form of non-identification with the inner self: it allows the 
organism both to reveal and to conceal itself, both to flatten itself and 
express the internal functionality, and to provide a free version of the self, a 
demonstrative one8. 
The unity of life, somehow divided, opens a world of infinite possibilities. 
The appearance of opaqueness, in fact, confines that which is vital and 
indispensable to survival, inside a hidden and asymmetrical world, while the 
external surface – symmetrical and bilateral – somehow seems to free itself 
from that which is lacking functionality: “the external aspect [das Äußere] 
becomes a field for expression which is used for representation and 
                                                 
5 Ibidem.  
6 Adolf Portmann, Um eine basale Anthropologie, in Biologie und Geist, Herder, Freiburg-
Basel-Wien 1963, pg. 240. 
7 Adolf Portmann, Le forme viventi, cited, pg. 24. 
8 Compare: Adolf Portmann, Um eine basale Anthropologie, cited, pg. 244: “If one observes 
the living activities in all their richness, then even ways of behaving obtain a significance, 
that cannot be inserted directly in the simple cycle of conservation, but that, for instance, 
are the expression of an atmosphere; therefore they do not have any marking value, but a 
value of representation”. (All German translations are by Oreste Tolone). 
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disclosure, and is clearly distinct from the conservation apparatus9“. The 
employment, then, of a surface so extended as that of the external one, for 
communication purposes, supplies the living being with dynamism and 
power, that are far superior to the previous levels; the relationship among 
organisms is richer and richer and the sphere of relational nature expands, 
allowing the foundation of a real sociable life. 
 
 
3. Conservation and self-presentation 
 
Therefore, according to Portmann, as a fundamental effect, this important 
morphological change results in the division of fields: in the more complex 
organizations, the inside is assigned to conservation, to the realization of 
vital functions, allowing the outside to be an expressive field, a place 
assigned to expression. In other words, it is as if, at a certain point of organic 
evolution, it became fundamental to guarantee the survival of organisms, 
the continuation of life, but also, or especially, for life to represent itself, 
displaying itself in all its superabundance of forms, in its euphoria and 
complexity, thus favouring communication among organisms. Self-
presentation (Selbstdarstellung) and self-growth (Selbststeigerung)10 become 
a central objective of life: the structure of representation goes beyond the 
structure of conservation! As a result, communicative and social dimension 
of the animal, seems essentially hyperthelic (hypertelisch) in the eyes of 
Portmann, and lacking function (funktionslos)11, therefore somehow detached 
from the conservation of the individual.  
In brief, the bi-dimensional nature linked to opaqueness of the surface 
and thus to the birth of interiority and of conscience, allows the appearance 
of a superior form of life, yes, characterized by an impulse toward 
conservation, but also by the need to express itself and to communicate 
indirectly with a world, with which, since the beginning, it has been 
connected by sympathy. 
It follows that such a separation goes at the same rate as the increasingly 
clear distinction between functional structures and aesthetic-representative 
structures. It is within this context, biological and of aesthetic function, 
                                                 
9 Ibidem, pg. 240. The quotation continues as follows: “The formal development of these 
possibilities exceeds, with an increasing level of organization, the elementary necessities of 
conservation, both in the olfactory and in the optical and acoustic scopes, in favour of a 
demonstrative role”. 
10 Ibidem, pg. 238; compare: Joachim Fischer, Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine 
Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts, Alber, Freiburg-München 2008, pg. 197-205. 
11 Adolf Portmann, Um eine basale Anthropologie, cited, pg. 238. 
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which is excellent in superior animals that the phenomenon of technique, as 
it appears in man, is to be interpreted and inserted. 
 
 
 
4. The expressive character of technique 
 
Naturally man possesses a more complex expressive ability. In man alone, 
really, can we speak of interiority, reflexivity, and conscience; only in man is 
the primary supra-individual structure – of which sociality is a sign – 
realized in a way that is free and not pre-arranged. In fact, though man is 
considered as part of a vital unit, he has an anthropological specificity: he is 
in his essence “historical”12. In line with the assumptions of philosophical 
anthropology (of Scheler and Plessner, more than of Gehlen)13, Portmann 
believes that, being man open to the world, (weltoffen), the weight of 
instincts and of inherited natural drives flows in a free and multiform way, 
and not according to a rigid and pre-arranged order. “The scarce instinctive 
fixation of most instincts is a human characteristic”14. This means that “the 
forms through which human groups order natural instinctive data, are with 
no exception “artificial”“15; drives are natural, but the social forms with 
which it is attempted to fix them, to tame them, are linked to their own 
time. Therefore, the need for a choice, for a decision that governs and 
determines form, that binds impulses and guides them, is peculiar to man: 
“natural instincts are given to us in a timeless way as much as all the forms, 
and all the social forms through which we attempt, from generation to 
generation, to block these instinctive forces, to tame them are bound in a 
temporal way”16. So both, acts linked directly to survival and expressive 
acts, fall within the scope of decision, representing, that is, artificial and 
creative ways to meet natural needs, freely, historically and in a flexible 
way. However – and here lies the core of the question – it is necessary to look 
at the concept of Selbstdarstellung in a broader sense: “Not only the voice, 
the gestures, are at the service of this representative function, but also the 
whole technique of man. It is, from the beginning, more than the balancing 
of a shortage, it is more than simple compensation of organic deficiencies, it 
is not just a replacement of absent somatic organs by intellectual works, but 
                                                 
12 Adolf Portmann, Im Kampf um das Menschenbild, in Biologie und Geist, cited, pg. 268. 
13 Compare: Adolf Portmann, Der Mensch – ein Mängelwesen?, in Entlässt die Natur den 
Menschen? cited, pgs. 200-209. 
14 Adolf Portmann, Im Kampf um das Menschenbild, in Biologie und Geist, cited, pg. 268. 
15 Ibidem, pgs. 268-269. 
16 Ibidem, pg. 270. 
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still, also the going beyond the organ, in which the impulse to self-growth is 
expressed in an imminent way as element of the human representative 
function”17. In other words, even today’s technique is expressive in man, 
though it may seem like a pure instrument for survival, but it is actually a 
demonstrative dimension of man.  
This, according to Portmann, implies a reconsideration of the idea of 
technique. It cannot be understood in its real nature if it is not intended as a 
means of expansion and presentation of oneself. Like in the elementary 
organic levels, even in man interiority and reflexivity – on which the 
possibility of technique is founded – have a very important representative 
function. Technique, even in its more advanced forms, as they emerged in 
the XX° century, cannot be explained without underlining its substantial 
aesthetic-expressive character. It is not just a way to compensate for 
weaknesses (Gehlen), nor an instrument of economy (Marx); on the contrary, 
in technique emerges the exuberance of nature, its will to communicate by 
multiplying forms of life and their visible aspects, that is, self-presentation. 
Not just optical, olfactory, etc. characters, but also the movements, the 
actions, the conscious expressions, are part of this impulse toward self-
presentation. So, using the words of our author again, “He who fights 
against the roar of a motorcycle rider, will soon realise that this noise 
certainly does not represent, for those who travel, trouble that is hard to 
avoid, but rather the acoustic manifestation of the rider, the self-growth of 
this individual, the greatest expansion of his individual or group sphere. If, 
therefore, technique is to be judged in human existence, then it cannot occur 
in the perspective according to which man is a deficient being 
(Mängelwesen), who compensates his weaknesses, or from the prevailing idea 
that economical relationships are the central, driving moment of social life. 
It is up to fundamental research to see the often neglected role of technique, 
as a means for self-presentation of man and of human groups, in its 
amplitude, and by that, to understand the demon of technical production in 
its significance18“. 
 
 
5. Theoretical function and hypertrophy of the self 
 
Well, technique, in its double value – of self-presentation and conservation – 
pursues, as its only objective, introduction of the organism within a 
historical and natural whole, one feels part of, to survive in, to communicate 
                                                 
17 Adolf Portmann, Um eine basale Anthropologie, in Biologie und Geist, cited, pg. 238. 
18 Ibidem, pgs. 238-239. 
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with, on the basis of an original sympathy. However, according to 
Portmann, throughout the centuries, the scientific and industrialize West 
has laid stress exclusively on the instrumental function of the intellect. 
Between the XII° and the XVI° centuries, a kind of decision was made in 
favour of the theoretical19, quantitative and qualitative which led, in actual 
fact, to a real supremacy of the method. It is the technique of Bacon that 
helps us to live and introduce man inside the world in the best of ways, by 
modifying him and manipulating him. The West renounced to the unity of 
natural life staking everything on control over the world through the 
research method20, sacrificing the aesthetic function to the advantage of the 
theoretical one. The theoretical function is the active one that uses the 
means of rational thought, the possibilities of scientific analysis, the 
instruments of mathematics: in the change to a technical rational type of 
thought, what occurred was, so to speak, a ‘mutation’21.  
No moralistic judgement or worse, obscurantism is visible in this, on the 
part of our author, as the consciousness of absolutization, which is 
detrimental to the unit and the fullness of human life. “The unpredictable 
increase of conscious life, of the functions of the Self, which results from 
rational research and an inevitable destiny. However, this destiny will lead 
to a completely diseased human being, to unilateral hypertrophy of the Ich-
Position”22. The risk is considerably obvious when such hypertrophy of the 
self pours not only in the surrounding world, but also in man himself. 
Manipulation, in its differing forms, therefore takes on the character of a 
threatening destiny. In the background, obviously, innumerable problems 
raised from new acquisitions in the field of genetics. 
Though its reflections date back to the 70s at the most, Portmann is 
already well aware of how the rapid progress of biology is accompanied by 
destruction of western ethics, as it was intended in modernity23. The great 
development of natural sciences, child of hypertrophy of the self, can involve 
misuse and unpredictable consequences. The possibilities of intervention in 
the genetic inheritance of future generations, the risk – more than dreaded 
by Sloterdijk24 – of human breeding, genetic planning of human variants, 
                                                 
19 Adolf Portmann, Biologisches zur Ästetischen Erziehung, in Biologie und Geist, cited, pg. 
250. 
20 Ibidem. 
21 Adolf Portmann, Der Mensch in Bereich der Planung, in Entlässt die Natur den 
Menschen? cited, pg. 355. 
22 Adolf Portmann, Biologisches zur Ästetischen Erziehung, in Biologie und Geist, cited, pg. 
258. 
23 Recuperando la posizione del Nobel Francis Crick. 
24 Compare: Peter Sloterdijk, Regole per il parco umano, in Non siamo ancora stati salvati, 
Bompiani, Milan 2004, pgs. 241-261. 
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unable to decide on their being, artificial insemination, the implanting of 
ovules in environments that are different from the maternal one, selection of 
the biological inheritance to be inherited etc.: with the diffusion of 
technique, and by means of these operations, man, today, can be planned 
and modified in the same way as the world. We are the ones, today, who are 
threatening other forms of life, including ourselves. It is true, however, that 
manipulation is a structural phenomenon of man-being25. The temptation to 
plan man has always existed; just think of the social custom of selecting a 
partner, of hostility towards foreigners, of man, of the claiming of presumed 
superiority of the white race, etc.26 What is new is the application of “more 
and more knowledge at the service of planning – the increasing role of 
science. What is also new is the rapid change in human vital space, the 
transformation of the earth into a space of technical structure”27. Evolution 
of the living being, today, is in our hands. 
  
 
6. Recovery of the aesthetic function 
 
Therefore, the real danger consists in the drying up of rationality, reduced to 
instrumental rationality and deprived of its close connection with 
imagination and fantasy, that is, the expressive function; all this leads to a 
form of disenchantment of the world. The world, scanned from theoretical 
rationality, essentially reduced to inert and inanimate matter28, lends itself 
to immediate technical use. The essential object becomes finding the best 
means for changing the world: the “compulsion to the new”29 is what guides 
the action of modern biology laboratories. Instead, it is necessary to recover 
the integrity of being man, reconciling rational thought and imagination, 
theoretical and aesthetical function. What Portmann hopes for is a man, in 
whom hypertrophy of the intellect alone does not determine the image of the 
world30. But what does ‘recovering the aesthetic function and giving space to 
the imagination’ mean, then? 
The progressive achievement of the “secondary world”, that is, of 
calculating rationality, has been occurring more and more to the detriment 
                                                 
25 Adolf Portmann, Manipulation des Menschen als Schicksal und Bedrohung, in Entlässt 
die Natur den Menschen? cited, pgs. 215-229. 
26 Adolf Portmann, Der Mensch in Bereich der Planung, cited, pg. 343. 
27 Ibidem, pg. 344. 
28 Il riferimento è evidentemente a Jonas; compare: Hans Jonas, Organismo e libertà. Verso 
una biologia filosofica, Einaudi, Torino 1999, pgs. 15-35. 
29 Adolf Portmann, Le forme viventi, cited, pg. 12. 
30 Adolf Portmann, Der Mensch in Bereich der Planung, cited, pg. 357. 
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of what he defines as the primary world. The “primary world” is that in 
which man finds a configuration of the world thanks to a primary 
imaginative spiritual activity; it is the one to which he relates, to what 
cannot be measured, by means of a thought in images: the analogy, poetry, 
art, etc. In other words, it is as if man had a mysterious intuition31, an 
original glance at the world in its expressiveness, not a pre-scientific glance, 
but an ascientific one, capable of grasping the unity of the whole, of 
communicating with it. 
It is the duty of society, but in the same way, of the scientific 
community, to prevent one of the two sources from drying up, or worse, 
being regarded as superfluous or harmful. It is to avoid – just to use an 
expression by Portmann, vaguely recalling activists in the 1968 protest 
movement – atrophy of the imagination and of fantasy in favour of reason.  
In the meeting with the world, it is necessary to pursue a Savoir par coeur, 
a loving acquaintance with things, colours, the external world32. Especially 
there, where rational thought reaches the limit of its possibilities, where it 
seems to have reached the boundaries of the knowable, there is a 
transformation: “unobserved, the imaginative function takes the initiative, 
prevails, and continues to write the text its way, with its language, in the 
expressive form of images”33. In fact, being our language the expression of 
human life in its wholeness, it contains much more than the rational 
function; it is the representation that leads man beyond the reality that can 
be grasped objectively. It allows us to sense around us a world that is less 
obvious, it creates unpredictable connections between things: “language not 
only thinks for us rationally, but it dreams in us. In this going beyond 
reality by means of spiritual creative forces, the power of that particular 
way of experimenting the world, which we called imaginative, is 
expressed”34. 
 In this aesthetic type of linguistic impulse, in this elan vital, comes to the 
light the archaic, primordial image of the “maternal foundation”, the 
mythical image of maternal and creative nature35, in whose womb it is 
supposed that all protagonists are inserted in pre-arranged relationships. 
The case of Icarus can be of emblematic example. The primitive desire to 
fly is obviously the expression of that imaginative way of having 
experiences, in contrast with the rational one; the legend of Icarus, however, 
also originates from the technical-intellectual power, from the waking dream 
                                                 
31 Ibidem. 
32 Adolf Portmann, Biologisches zur Ästetischen Erziehung, cited, pg. 259. 
33 Adolf Portmann, Mythisches in der Naturforschung, in Biologie und Geist, cited, pg. 88. 
34 Ibidem, pg. 97. 
35 Ibidem, p. 88. 
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that becomes scientific rationalization. And if the analogy man-bird is 
technically misleading from a scientific point of view – think of the first 
disastrous attempts to fly by imitation – but it acts as a spur. The history of 
scientific research is full of battles against the mythical component. Not only 
is this wrong from the epistemological point of view, but it is also harmful 
for the harmonious spiritual formation. In fact, those who think this way 
“forget that, everywhere, in the most precise fields of research, real 
productive thought itself needs intuitive and spontaneous work of creation, 
and therefore of aesthetic function; they forget that dreaming and waking 
dream, as every experience of the senses, opens inestimable possibilities”36. 
Rational thought and thought by images represent two substantial ways of 
being of man37. 
  
 
7. Isomorphism of the world 
 
Thus, man is able to become part of reality, to elaborate intuitively a 
consistent and harmonic image of the world, where full correspondence 
among all living beings seems to exist, only if he puts an end to 
contemporary atrophy of the imagination and hypertrophy of the self, which 
established itself in the age of technique. Only recourse to aesthetic and 
imaginative intuition of the surrounding world, only the recovery of 
attention to self-expressiveness of nature – and of man in nature – will help 
man to understand the intimate consonance existing among creatures, the 
intimate harmony of the parts, with moderative effect on the arrogance of 
reason.  
Pollination, for instance, assumes that the flower is seen by the butterfly 
and that the scent is perceived; the chromatic shades of living beings assume 
the appearance of sentient eyes, or anyway of sight organs for which to 
appear: it is as if there were a correspondence between an innate structure, 
present in the interiority of the organism, and reality. It is as if the way of 
being of two distinct organisms acted according to a pre-established 
harmony, or better, as if it merged into one super-individual entity38. The 
birds orienting themselves – in the migration period – with the 
constellations, assumes that the interiority of the animal had been 
                                                 
36 Adolf Portmann, Biologisches zur Ästetischen Erziehung, cited, pg. 255. 
37 “These two ways of having experience [that is, imagination and rational thought] are in 
a polar opposition” (Adolf Portmann, Mythisches in der Naturforschung, in Biologie und 
Geist, cited, pg. 86). 
38 Adolf Portmann, L’interpretazione come problema biologico, in Le forme viventi, cited, pg. 
82. 
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connected, since the beginning, to the vision of the firmament. It is as if, 
Kant would say, there were a sense, an object, to which all contribute. 
Wolfgang Koehler calls such intimate “isomorphism”39. 
Even in the human experience of the world there are isomorphic 
elements, such as the appearance of a smile in a newborn child and the model 
of the human face40. However, in man it is difficult to distinguish between 
what is nature and what is culture; as man is an open and premature being41, 
even the innate structures become consolidated culturally during the first 
year; thus the social world becomes a decisive factor, even in the formation 
of those innate isomorphic correspondences. Like the bird, man too has 
unconscious forces, aimed at dominating the world; but his task is that of 
breaking this archaic, Ptolemaic vision of the world; orientation in the 
world, is no longer innate in him, but it is the task of reason. These two ways 
of being – of the bird and of man - “originate from secluded sources of life, 
from forces that realize this life in its varied forms and to which both 
migration of the warblers and our most ambitious space projects must trace 
back”42.  
However, the deep spiritual dissatisfaction linked to western civilization – 
that of space projects, precisely – conceals the nostalgia of an aesthetic 
approach to life, it hides the need to unhinge the tyranny of theoretical 
reason. This does not mean so much, as Portmann underlines, to educate to 
become artists or things of this sort, as rather to recover an aesthetic 
communication with the world43.  
To observe the world in an aesthetic way means, therefore, to grasp the 
expressive, self-representative value and thus to feel as part of a whole that 
addresses me and which I am a part of. Super-individuality, peculiar to 
organic expressiveness, prevents man from transforming everything into 
being, allowing him to sense the unity of the whole, appealing to the forces 
of imagination. 
The man, who is open to the world, imagines his future and realizes it 
rationally. Aesthetic and theoretical function and primary and secondary 
world, are thus obliged to proceed in unison. 
 
                                                 
39 Adolf Portmann, Mythisches in der Naturforschung, in Biologie und Geist, cited, pg. 101. 
40 Ibidem, pg. 104. 
41 Compare: Adolf Portmann, Zoologie und das neue Bild des Menschen, Rowohlt, Basel 
1951. 
42 Adolf Portmann, L’interpretazione come problema biologico, cited, pgs. 112-113. 
43 What the present demands, in fact, is “mobilization of all the spiritual forces that 
would be suitable for recreating balance in man, that would be suitable for the forming of 
a man, no longer intellectual, but happy” (Adolf Portmann, Biologisches zur Ästetischen 
Erziehung, cited, pg. 259.) 
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8. Techno mania and technophobia  
 
The use of an engineering technique applied to the transformation of man 
thus finds, in Portmann, a determined opponent. This may lead us to ask 
whether there is, in him, after all, a “phobia” towards technique. The 
resistances that we find in his works, at times, appear to be an actual refusal, 
and the feeling that there is an impediment a priori may be legitimate. With 
respect to the complexity of the problem of transformation of man, and to 
the scarce global vision of the effects that our interventions may involve, one 
must wonder whether man, in his current form, represents a persistent, 
stable rule or whether the way to metamorphosis of man is open. No less 
than the current debate on the post-human and hybridization44. Well, faced 
with this great challenge, Portmann moves cautiously, tending to underline 
more the connate risks related to such a turn than its intrinsic potentialities, 
embracing a sort of heuristics of fear. Unlike Hans Jonas45, though, what 
stands out is fear of the violation of dignity of man, of the inhuman, more 
than fear of destruction of the planet. He moves according to a principle of 
caution. Biological progress proceeds much more rapidly than our capacity of 
adapting to social changes; which means that man in his ethical and social 
dimension does not measure up to the possible changes, or better, does not 
keep pace with the technical transformations46. Political and social 
backwardness keep the right decisions from being made in the proper time. 
Moreover “the time needed for the real transformation of organisms, 
definitely goes beyond the lapse of time that our intellect can dominate with 
the glance, and more than ever beyond the lapse of time in which the 
swinging conduct of man can carry out resulting interpretative processes”47. 
This means that, without the sufficient anticipatory capacity, and with the 
inevitable social resistance to radical and ungovernable changes, it is 
necessary to cautiously keep to the rules of man in his current form. Natural 
                                                 
44 For a broad picture of the contemporary debate and an exhaustive bibliography, see 
Roberto Marchesini, Post-human. Verso nuovi modelli di esistenza, Bollati Boringhieri, 
Torino 2005. 
45 Compare: Hans Jonas, Il principio responsabilità. Un’etica per la civiltà tecnologica, 
Einaudi, Torino 1993. 
46 Adolf Portmann, Biologie als technische Weltmacht, cited, pg. 378. 
47 “With respect to the complexity of our current form of life and with respect to the fact 
that we only grasp the problem of transformation of man partially, we must – it seems to 
me – conserve this rule much longer” (ibidem, pg. 377). 
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evolution will proceed in the societies as well, in a slow and unrelenting way, 
as always, exceeding by far our reassuring glance. Therefore, “hands off a 
form of life that we have not created ourselves”48. To avoid a “catastrophe”, 
it is necessary to “restrain” the powers that can annihilate the supreme 
forms of nature. Nor, yet, is it useful to take risks down impassable, 
unpredictable slopes when science is given more pressing and urgent tasks: 
“future bio-technique has enough saving tasks: to help in the preservation of 
nature around us, to relieve the real suffering of man”49. 
Portmann invokes caution. Because man is able to intervene in 
development and in human and environmental evolution, in a lasting way; 
because he has the strength to create effects that survive his own existence, 
and that only man in the historical succession can examine; because the 
human eye is too limited and short-sighted to expect to start processes that 
only others will be asked to inspect and perhaps suffer: for all these reasons 
man has no right to intervene in situations where the outcome and 
development do not appear certain. Unlike Teilhard de Chardin, who sees in 
liberty the human instrument for continuing the evolution of nature50, 
Portmann – denoting a certain underlying  - narrows the scope of 
intervention of human liberty, so to speak, to ecology and the care of man.  
In our opinion, and to conclude, Adolf Portmann redefines the sense of 
human technique, conceiving it as the extreme development of that process 
which – from the appearance of the opaque surface on – has created a bi-
dimensional nature in the living world. With the appearance of opposition 
between inside and outside, this nature represents the first form of non-
transparency, and therefore of mediacy, from which the central nervous 
system and reflexivity are born.  From this moment, expressiveness in its 
different forms – conscious and unconscious, functional and non-functional – 
takes on the value of a technique51, an instrument of manifestation.  
Such a dilatation of technique can most get closer, in Portmann, to a 
techno mania, in the sense that every self-presentation, is a form of 
technique, a way nature expresses itself. This involves an equalization of 
cultural techniques to natural ones, to the extent that they both originate 
from the same ineradicable need for expressiveness. Even technical, 
functional and manipulative actions always have, in some way, an 
expressive aim; they express the living being that performs them.  
                                                 
48 Ibidem, pg. 378. 
49 Ibidem, pg. 379. 
50 For a comparison with the thought of Teilhard de Chardin, see Adolf Portmann, Der 
Pfeil des Humanen. Über Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Alber, Freiburg-München 1960. 
51 Adolf Portmann, Um eine basale Anthropologie, cited, pg. 244. 
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Man, however, can use his conscious technique not just to enter the game 
of natural expressiveness, but also to interrupt isomorphism, to exit the 
game of correspondence with other living beings of the cosmos, expressing 
himself in the power of rationality. Hypertrophy of the self, invasion of the 
quantitative, are a way to express mutilation of a subject who is trying to do 
without his other half, who censors communication with the cosmos in 
return for control. But the drift he gets lost in originates exactly from 
forgetfulness of the firmament, with which he no longer is familiar, from 
coldness and from silence in the surrounding world, with which he has 
interrupted all communication. In this case technique becomes phobic, 
something to be afraid of, the emblem of a self-referential expressiveness, 
which does not seem to pay attention any longer to that symbolic world, of 
which he too is part, as a living being. 
  
